The success of conservation efforts does not depend just on having a good project design. The national and international resource management infrastructure plays an important role in enabling projects to meet their goals or in presenting barriers to effective implementation. A study of the institutional infrastructure for resource management in Madagascar has revealed that certain factorswith regards to communication between institutional levels, the integration of national-level players at all phases of project design, and appropriate institutional development, for example -may encourage positive institutional interactions and as a consequence, effective integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP). This article considers the interlinked levels of political analysis, examining the relationship between institutional structure and effectiveness in meeting conservation objectives. It advocates the fuIl participation of nationals in conservation initiatives and that individual projects be given the flexibility to develop innovative schemes and confront unintended circumstances at the local level.
all identified the same problems). The local people are reliable authorities in designing, implementing and evaluating specific interventions designed to maintain protected area boundaries. They create alternative sources of fire and construction wood and promote more efficient agricultural techniques. The new development efforts do not favor the wealthiest segment of the population, thereby widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots. The villagers respond positively to education on how to understand the problems of deforestation and in how to implement strategies to combat it. The contribution of independent findings and constructive criticism by outside researchers and consultants are considered valuable as part of the process of fine-tuning the operation. Projects are flexible to incorporate changes to address unforeseen circumstances, and communication between project personnel runs like clockwork. Finally, the project meets its goals of halting destructive resource use practices, and when it leaves the area, the people continue to hold conservation as a primary objective.
What does it take to achieve the goals of conservation and development? Studies have pointed out that involvement of local people in all phases of a project constitutes an important variable in its success (West and Brechin 1991) . Sussman, et at. (1994) also note the importance of locating projects in areas where conservation pressures are highest. Yet a flawless ICD project design is not sufficient for meeting the goals of sustainable resource management, since the wider national and international institutional infrastructure actively shapes the ways in which projects can be implemented.
Given the interconnectedness of institutions, even the most wellformulated project cannot succeed in a vacuum. If ICD project staff radically restructured its interventions to solicit consistent levels of grassroots participation and to situate their efforts within ecological hotspots, conservation policies at higher levels may impede them from carrying it out. In thinking about the success of conservation projects, one must consider a local project as part of a larger global system of structured possibilities. Anthropologists and other conservation and development professionals must focus not only on how to design a more effectual ICDP, but on how to construct positive working relations between projects and the institutions under which they function.
In this article, I will examine the relationship between institutional infrastructure and effectiveness in meeting the goals of conservation and development and will discuss the position of ICDPs in Madagascar with regards to donor organizations, host governments, and the processes they establish to monitor and evaluate project activities. In addition to exploring the ways in which institutions encourage some interventions and inhibit others, I suggest strategies for building strong cross-institutional ties. Because of the focus on institutions and on national and international level articulations, this is not so much a smallscale, village-level analysis as it is an investigation of articulations between local, national, and international level contexts.
The basis of this study stems from five weeks of research in the capital, Antananarivo, when I was a consultant in Madagascar for the UNDP's Global Environment Facility, as a part of their initiative to evaluate conservation efforts from a first phase offunding (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) and to plan the second fiveyear phase. During that time I interviewed over forty professionals in conservation-related fields and read numerous project documents. This short period of research built on my previous experience in Madagascar. From 1992 -1993 
State of the Environment in Madagascar
Documentarieson televisionas wellas scholarlyandpopular writings have identified Madagascar as an ecological "jewel"(The Futurist 1990): where beautiful and endemic -species abound. But, they warn, deforestation threatens this island paradise. Most identify the local people as the parties responsible for the current deteriorated state of the environment. One author commented, for example, that:
"As in much of the tropics, the people living in the Ranomafana rainforest of southeastern Madagascar are the forest's worst enemy, slashing and burning huge swaths of trees to clear land for crops (Knox 1989:81) ." Swidden agriculture, they remark, is so devastating that 50% of the southeastern rain forest disappeared between 1950 and 1985, and in 1985 only 34% remained of the estimated original extent of the forest . Over-grazing has prevented forest regeneration, and erosion of the island's red soil is so acute that rivers appear as tomato soup when viewed from above. The use of wood for charcoal has devastated thousands of acres of forest. Population increases and the pressure to create more farmland make hopes for conservation. seem in vain. The message the public receives is that Madagascar is tragically self-destructing.
When searching for reasons for the environmental devastation, however, these reports often fail to question the links between deforestation and world system dynamics. Geographer Lucy Jarosz (1993) noted, for example, that French colonial practices significantly contributed to the denuding of the southeastern rain forest. For one, cash crops, especially coffee, claimed the most fertile areas, forcing cultivators to clear the forest slopes for subsistence. Also, population density increased as people fled to the forests to escape colonial skirmishes as well as from internal migrations from the south of the country by people seeking wage labor in order to pay taxes. Throughout the island, the colonial state gave concessionary rights to both Malagasy and European parties to log large expanses of hardwood forest. According to Jarosz, much forest was destroyed in the early colonial period (between 1896 and 1925) by a combination of factors, including logging, shifting cultivation, and grazing.
Beginning with Blaikie and Brookfield's seminal work (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987) , which recognized the complex political and economic factors involved in land degradation, scholars have begun to question population increase as a major factor in land deforestation. Jarosz notes that although population increase may be a factor in deforestation, "as a causal power it was of negligible importance during a 40-year period in which approximately four million hectares of forest were felled (1994:376) ." Campbell and Olson agree that:
Populationgrowthcannotbe seensimplyas the inherent driving force behind poverty and environmental degradation but as a process dependent upon the interaction of social, economic and political factors (1991:8) .
They warn that insistence on population increase as the cause of degradation masks global political and economic contexts and the social and ecological marginalization of the target countries.
Whatever the cause of environmental degradation, the loss of biodiversity and forest cover has significant implications for Madagascar and for the world. Aside for its intrinsic worth, biodiversity is arguably important as a source of medicinal plants, used locally or turned into internationally available pharmaceuticals (see also Harper 1994) . Forest cover is important as habitat for many species of fauna, and as part of watershed ecosystems, providing water both for farming and urban consumption. Both the government of Madagascar and the international community, therefore, have a stake in encouraging use of the environment which is sustainab!e on a long term basis.
In the early to mid-1990s, the ICDP concept, as located on the edge of protected areas and administered by NGOs, has been one of the most publicized and well-funded approaches to this issue and its effectiveness is therefore worth assessing. Since conservation trends ebb and flow, the future of such interventions is unknown, however. In Madagascar, for example, the Strategic Objecti ve Agreement, signed in August 1997 between USAID (one of the major funders of ICDPs in the past) and the government of Madagascar, stated that while ICDPs address the issue of the link between poverty and "the spiral of environmental degradation," they "are not a sustainable answer as they are too costly for the limited population reached (USAID 1997:2, emphasis added)." Instead, the document strongly advocates a"landscape ecology approach,"which links threats to biodiversity to broad geographic areas. The document also puts strong emphasis on the role of the private sector in addition to NGOs and governmental organizations, in conservation. Whatever the target population and whoever the agents of conservation, a careful examination of ICDP functioning can provide insight into the complex links between local, national, and international players and into the effectiveness of local-level interventions.
The ICDP Approach
One of the central aspects of the ICDP approach and of conservation in general in Madagascar assumes that poverty leads to resource degradation 1 and is therefore committed to providing resource use alternatives to those who live near areas to be protected. The two hypotheses guiding ICDP activities in Madagascar are: 1) development in the peripheral zones will positively influence the conservation of protected areas; and 2) development actions which involve local populations will turn the people into partners in conservation (ANGAP 1993) . By integrating conservation with development, conservation workers have recognized that the "fences" approach to conservation -where people are forcibly kept out of protected areas by fences and patrol -will not work in the long run.
Rather, local people must be considered partners in a long-term, sustainable conservation effort (West and Brechin 1991) .
Many projects in Madagascar have adopted participatory approaches. Evaluation documents revealed that the ICD project on the Masoala peninsula has created village associations in the hopes that the villagers' will be partners in conservation activities. Two other projects, ones at the Zahamena Strict Nature Reserve and at the Ranomafana National Park, through the intervention of the USAID KEPEM program, have introduced a system of decentralized management through contracts with villagers. The project at the Andoahela Integral Natural Reserve has held. village-level workshops where local people could contribute to discussions on how to design the project. All ICD projects have used participatory rural appraisal techniques to become more familiar with the villagers' opinions and understandings.
Despite these efforts and despite a genuine willingness on the part of ICDP personnel to take on local people as full partners, the amount of effective and consistent participation remains low. Evaluators and outside researchers often find that even efforts that look good on paper lack effectiveness. For example, evaluations reveal that newly-created village associations often privilege a certain segment of the population at the expense of others, and local people may not understand the,terms of a contractual agreement in the same way as one who is more familiar with the global political and economic system. Village-level meetings may only superficially uncover 464 HUMAN ORGANIZATION local opinions, and then only the opinions of a certain segment of the population. In the Ankarana region, where I did my longterm research, participation was restricted to those who were being paid to do so -mostly as Agents for the Protection of Nature (APNs)
-and was not a general community involvement. Tension existed between the project staff and the indigenous Antankarana leader (Gezon 1997) . Efforts at encouraging participation were inhibited by the project staff's lack of knowledge of local political processes. Individual projects can be redesigned to be more effective, for example, by becoming familiar with local processes of decision-making and conflict management, by supplementing participatory rural appraisal and rapid rural appraisal information-gathering methods with open-ended participant observation, and by identifying ways of incorporating the findings of independent researchers into project designs.
But an internationally-funded ICD project staff cannot so easily address one constraint -that of its position within a top-down administrative structure. Many negative evaluations of projects do not take into consideration the structural limitations placed on the form of interventions and the manner in which they may be carried out. This lesson became particularly clear to me in 1995 when workjng on the UNDP/ GEF consultancy. I was first commissioned to write the report on the "lessons learned from conservation projects," identifying the strengths .and weakness of the various projects (Gezon 1995a) . Soon after I began to do research on this issue, I was asked to write an additional report on the institutional infrastructure of natural resource management, including local, national and international levels of analysis (Gezon 1995b) . I agreed to write it, since I had already found that project issues were inextricably linked to institutional issues. I began to realize how limited it was just to focus on the actual on-the-ground conservation and development projects. It was easy to note certain shortcomings in the ICDPs: the need for more participation, effective communication, and better integration of outside research findings in project design and evaluation. But tying on-the-ground projects in with a larger institutional infrastructure was more of a challenge. My research on institutions made me realize that understanding success and failure in conservation was more complex than looking at individual project designs. That even well-intentioned and fairly well-designed projects seemed consistently not to meet their objectives led me to take a closer look at the entire, multi-level system of conservation and development. The subject of analysis shifted from focusing on the local, ground-level projects to examining them within national and even international contexts.
Institutional Framework of NEAP
Madagascar has been the focus of conservation efforts since the 1980's, when international donor institutions such !is the World Bank and USAID took an interest in the island continent's high level of biodiversity and the concurrent threat to it faced from environmental destruction. The Bank became particularly interested in the environment after having recieved strong criticism for sponsoring environmentally insensitive projets elsewhere in the world. USAID opened its Madagascar office in 1983, and its environmental program, led by a team in Nairobi, was encouraged by the strong environmental lobby in the USA. By the late 1980's, the World Bank became the leading donor institution, coordinating the activities and policies of an association of donors.2
The Malagasy government had shown its dedication to environmental issues as early as 1984, when it drafted the National Strategy for Conservation and Developmentrecognized as being one ofthe first national environmental plans established in Africa. It was particularly noteable for its inclusion of both conservation and development in the same frame of reference. At the same time that theories of integrated conservation and development were becoming popular in the international community, the Malagasy representatives added an extra emphasis that human needs must be considered as well as those of the environment. Despite Madagascar's apparent willingness to participate in a national conservation plan, some have argued that the government had little choice. Faced with increasing dependence on the international community for loans just to keep its population fed, the country had complex reasons for wanting to gain international favor (Hewitt 1992) .
The Government of Madagascar organized the International Conference of Conservation for Sustainable Development in 1985, where a special commission was appointed to carry out the goals of the national conservation strategy. In 1987-88, the Government, in collaboration with donor institutions, elaborated a more in-depth conceptual framework, called the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP),3 to be executed in three 5-year phases, beginning in 1991.
The international donor community, by this time led by the World Bank, promised the government of Madagascar high levels of funding for environmental projects (around $120 milIion for the first five-year period), but required the government to make legal and institutional changes before disbursing the money. On the legal front, the Malagasy government had to create a law recognizing the structure of the NEAP. In 1990, it passed the Charte de I'Environnement to fulfill this requirement. The Charte defined the role of the state and of each of the executing agencies ofthe NEAP (see below). The government of Presid!?nt Zafy Albert further consolidated its interest in the environment in 1992, when the constitution of the Third Republic overtly recognized the importance of "I'Environnement." The constitution stated that each person must respect the environment and that the state would assure its protection. This formal recognition of the importance of conservation has continued under the current leader, President Ratsiraka.
. Aside from legal adjustments, conservation leaders from the . donor institutions as well as. the government determined that the existing institutional structure was insufficient to carry out the mandates of the NEAP. A World Bank report (1990) , which has come to be recognized as the official NEAP document, describes that setting up and reinforcing conservation institutions was one of the major goals of the first phase of funding, from [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . Some government agencies were strengthened: The Direction des Eaux et Forets (Department of Water and Forests-DEF), to be in charge of protecting and managing biodiversity; the cartographic agency, FTM; and the Direction des Domaines (DD), to establish boundaries around protected areas and title private property. But the donors mandated that three new quasi-private institutions (private institutions with a public mandate) be formed to handle the jj\ III I increased attention to the environment: In 1990-91, through a joint effort between donors and government representatives, they created the Office National de I'Environnement (ONE) as a governmental coordinating institution, with the specific charge to oversee environmental education and research; the Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protegees (AN GAP -National Association for the Management of Protected Areas) to oversee protected area management (created and sustained largely through the efforts of USAID); and the Association Nationale d' Actions Environnementales (ANAE -National Association of Environmental Action) to address issues of soil conservation and watershed management. Both international and Malagasy Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) became involved as contractors, or operators, for specific projects.
In the second phase of the NEAP, the Strategic Objective Agreement shifted emphasis from building institutional capacity to assuring the country's ability to sustain its conservation activities in the long-term through the creation of a "nationallevel environmental foundation (USAID 1997: 10) ," as well as mechanisms such as user fees and green taxes. Other institutional emphases are on the creation of environmental units in related ministries (such as mines, tourism, energy, and agriculture), which would devise appropriate policies regulating resource use, and the projected change in status of ANGAP to becoming a National Park Service.
Locating ICDPs
Where do ICDP's fit into this institutional framework? Within the institutional structure of the first phase, they have been officially managed by the Department of Water and Forests (DEF) (as are all forests), but coordinated by ANGAP, one of the newly created institutions. ANGAP was legally recognized as a private association in November 1990, and in December 1991, its public utility was legally established, as well as its right to manage revenues from park entrance fees (effective June 1992). It resembles a public institution in that it is officialIy under the supervision of the DEF and its mandate is to coordinate the management of protected areas, which is public land. ANGAP was specifically mandated to oversee the establishment of integrated conservation and development activities in fifty protected areas (39 of which had already been established by mid-1995) . For this, ANGAP adopted the integrated conservation and development approach as its working hypothesis: that development interventions in the peripheral zones ofthe protected areas will positively influence the conservation of the those areas.
In managing the protected areas during the first phase, ANGAP has mainly coordinated organizations such as World Wide Fund for Nature and Conservation International that donors have contracted to manage individual ICDPs on the ground. It had in 1995 also assumed direct responsibility for managing three protected areas (at Manombo, Lokobe and Isalo). In the effort of developing a consistent conservation strategy, AN GAP required the projects to take up certain common approaches: For example, each project must identify five target areas where they determine the pressure to be the greatest and restrict development to these zones. In addition, projects must demonstrate in annual work reports and work ~p lans that each of their interventions is directly tied to the goal of conservation.
Structurally, the ICDPs are at the bottom of lengthy chains of command. As the operator of the Mt. d' Ambre project in the north of Madagascar, for example, WWF must conform to directives from both USAID, as their donor, and from AN GAP. In addition, the technical assistants and other project staff are also directly employed by WWF, and must keep in line with the requirements of the central WWF offices in the capital, Antananarivo, and international offices in Washington D.C. and Geneva.
Corresponding with the ICDP's lack of autonomy is their high level of funding. Compared with other conservation efforts in Madagascar, ICDPs have received a disproportionately large share of conservation and development resources during the first phase of funding (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) . USAID alone has allocated $40 million on protected area management projects during the first phase (through the SAVEM project). Aside from USAID, the majority of donors contribute in some way to protected area management, mostly through contributions to ICDPs.
ICDPs are not isolated, but exist within this politically charged national and international framework as a highly funded and heavily scrutinized entity. As part of an international conservation effort, ICDPs are embedded in a network of national and global communities and institutions including donors such as the World Bank and USAID, those who monitor and evaluate, such as ANGAP and the ONE, and project implementors such as WWF, Yale University, and Malagasy NGOs such as the one affiliated with the Protestant church, FJKM. Expatriate experts often operate as researchers, consultants, and technical advisors, who often double as project leaders. The tourists who visit the protected areas are both Malagasy and foreign. Malagasy nationals have become involved in the projects as directors, support staff, and as the target population for the projects' activities. The local ICDP is inextricably meshed within extralocal arenas.
Institutional StrUcture and the Effectiveness of ICDPs

FLEXIBILITY
The global institutional infrastructure can both encourage and restrict an ICDP's ability to be effective in meeting conservation goals. For the case of Madagascar, I identified four particular points of institutional articulation that affect the functioning of local-level projects, including the amount of flexibility a project has for addressing unforeseen circumstances, the nature of funding arrangements, the ways of dividing jurisdiction between the various agencies, and the role of expatriates as technical advisors. Although the material presented is specific to the Madagascar case, this analysis points out some common themes in internationally funded conservation and/or development projects in other parts of the world.
Flexibility is important because it allows a project to depart from a top-down management style and encourages the staffto , listen more closely to the voices of the local people. Requiring projects to identify specific interventions that they are then bound to carry out prevents them from addressing the 466 HUMAN ORGANIZATION unexpected and unpredictable. Ideally, a project would be designed to allow a maximum of flexibility to alter plans and approaches, based on unforeseen circumstances and more complete information that may become apparent only after an original project document was written and approved.
Local project leaders can only be flexible if the donors and other agencies allow' them to be, however, and the complex system of project monitoring, and evaluation in Madagascar has often precluded such an inductive design process. Project planning documents tend to be treated as contracts, and success depends on by how well results match up with the original plan. The document outlining the second phase of funding, for example, suggests its unwillingness to be flexible in noting that activities other than those specifically outlined will only be funded if they have a "clear, feasible and high-quality wor!<:-plan and time-line (USAID 1997:12)" -in other words, only if people predict exactly what will unravel. Lack of flexibility was particularly an issue since ANGAP and USAID (which funded several of the ICDPs) required such elaborate annual evaluation and planning reports. Specific projects complained that it had taken them six months to write an annual report that USAID would accept. Not only does such a system impede flexibility, but it also prevents staff !Tom being involved in interventions on the ground.
FUNDING
The disadvantage of excessive monitoring closely aligns with an advantage that has also framed the ICDPs' place within the institutional framework as the recipients of high levels of funding. The availability offunding affects the scope of a project and the kind of work project staff can do on the ground. With high budgets, many projects have purchased several 4-wheel drive vehicles and ample office equipment, as well as bicycles and camping equipment for the village-level conservation agents.
Although adequate funding is the dream of many development projects, being so heavily financed has its own set of unintended consequences. For one, seeing such displays of conspicuous consumption can lead local people to think more about Western affluence than the importance of environmentalist goals. The people living in the peripheral zone of the Ankarana Special Reserve in the far north, for example, equated WWF and the Mt. d' Ambre conservation project with Western wealth and fancy consumer items. As a result, the people less readily contribute their own time, labor, and energy to a project that seems to have all the resources it needs. Researchers and applied workers have noted a similar tension in conservation projects throughout Madagascar. Many justify such expenditures based on the requirements of conservation, noting that without fourwheel drive trucks, for example, they could not reach the more remote areas or transport equipment as efficiently. While this point is indisputable, this philosophy contrasts with that of the Association Nationale d' Actions Environnementales (ANAE), which handles issues of soil and watershed conservation. Its staff has noted the value of arriving in villages and transporting materials by the same means as the villagers themselves: by foot, bicycle or public transportation (Koto Rabemananjara, personal communication). They have found that this is the best way to encourage the local people to become involved and have a sense of ownership.
But even if one could justify such expenditures based on the requirements of conservation, those levels of financing may not be sustainable in the long term and may set a project up for long-term failure. Conservation activities whose structure and functioning depends upon such a high budget may not be prepared to operate when the international donors eventually step out. The NEAP's IS-year plan spans longer than most development programs, but it does not represent much time even in the span of the young country's existence. Unsustainable financing does not tend to prepare conservation efforts to continue indefinitely and sets up the whole conservation effort as a potential failure. Furthermore, it marks the ICDP efforts rather clearly as top-down, externally-motivated activities.
ANGAP, as a Malagasy agency charged with overseeing protected areas, has in fact been concerned about the future of financing for conservation in Madagascar. This is reflected in the Strategic Objective Agreement for the second phase of funding, which calls for the establishment of a trust fund, green taxes, and user fees with the specific goal of making conservation self-sustaining. They also seek to embellish ecotourism as a source of revenue. The issue of future financing is complicated, however, and even ecotourism is not a straightforward solution. While revenues from tourism can certainly be increased in Madagascar, the general infrastructure ofthe country must first be improved before anything significant can be realized. Tourists can also become intrusive and bring on negative unintended consequences for both people and resources when areas become too heavily traveled. Despite the difficulties, ANGAP has successfully argued that future selffinancing must be on the agenda for the next phases of the NEAP. '
JURISDICTION
The structure and hierarchy of leadership also affects the functioning of ICDPs on the ground. Having clearly defined jurisdictions~for example, reduces tension and encourages efficiency, especially in the complex conservation network of Madagascar. For example, tension at the national level between the governmental Department of Water and Forests (DEF) and the quasi-private ANGAP has made it difficult during the first phase for the project staff and staff of the regional office of the DEF to work together cooperatively. While the management of the protected areas has been clearly in ANGAP's jurisdiction, authority over the land around the areas, called the peripheral zones, has been less clear. Often there are forests in these areas, from which the local people are supposed to be able to satisfy )heir need for forest projects (construction wood, medicinal plants, etc.). Although the DEF has official control over these areas, ANGAP and the ICDPs have targeted their conservation and development interventions there. Tension has arisen over the right to work in these areas and to sanction infractions. The strain has been exasperated by the DEF's relative lack of material reinforcements (due to comparatively low levels of funding) and ANGAP's lack of official authority. The result of such stress between institutions is animosity between project and DEF staff at the local level, which translates into an unwillingness to share information an inability to work together to confront the challenges of conserving the local resource base. In 1995, ANGAP noted its hope to become more distinct from the DEF in several ways in the second phase of the NEAP (after 1996) . First, it hoped to turn the peripheral zone into a legal construct, thereby securing the right to manage it. Also, it envisioned moving out from the auspices of the DEF by evolving from its role as a coordinator of PA interventions during the first phase to becoming a National Park Service with the authority to manage PAs and develop ecotourism. Indeed, the Strategic Objective Agreement indicates that ANGAP is slated to become such an entity (1997:6) . If ANGAP becomes a national park service, the relationships between individual ICDPs and the global institutional structure will necessarily change in response to ANGAP's reevaluated strategies and as a result of its new structural position in relation to other governing bodies, such as the DEE Having clear lines of jurisdiction allows projects to operate with a maximum amount of cooperation from other agencies and to avoid turf disputes which detract from the goals of conservation.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Another issue that affects the functioning of ICDPs on the ground is the relationships of expatriates to national staff. The leadership structure imposed on the ICDPs places in charge a national director and a technical assistant, most often expatriate. Officially, the technical assistant is only allowed to advise and train the national director and staff. The director alone, on the other hand, has enforceable decision-making power. For several reasons, tension often pervades the relationship between these two leaders. For one, although the directors are the only ones to have official authority to make decisions, the donors tend to hold technical assistants responsible for a project's actions. This undermines both the technical assistant's role as an advisor and the director's role as a decision-maker. Secondly, tension arises from a hierarchical dynamic inherent in the relationship, since the technical assistant is by definition more competent than the counterpart. The fact that most technical assistants are expatriate and counterparts are always Malagasy makes this dynamic even more jarring, since it replays the relationship between economically and politically powerful Northern nations and the marginalized South.
The hierarchy and leadership structure of ICDPs in Madagascar, mandated by the donor agencies in collaboration with Malagasy agencies, makes communication difficult among project leadership. Consequently, because of internal tensions, even well-designed projects may never get executed because of conflicts between project leaders. Poorly defined leadership roles has been a factor, for example, in the high turn-over rate of leaders in the Mt. d' Ambre project in northern Madagascar. The project saw three sets of official leaders and two transitional periods of leadership between 1989 and 1995, as some were fired and others resigned early. Project continuity suffers greatly from such ruptures of leadership.
Issues of flexibility, the nature of funding, and leadership structures form parameters within which projects must operate. Projects may envision grassroots participation in all phases of project design, develop an effective environmental education program, and set up a system for working with outside researchers and consultants. But whether or not they can implement these interventions depends to some degree on the larger institutional infrastructure and the working dynamics that it encourages and permits.
Suggestions for Improvement
Can institutional structures be improved to make conservation efforts on the ground more effective? Some have suggested that trying to do so is futile. James Ferguson (1994) argues that "the 'development' apparatus in Lesotho... is a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power" (1994:255) through the construction of roads, for example, to more remote areas and by delivering services for which people must adhere to a rigid bureaucratic protocol. He recognizes that this expansion is a "side effect"of development efforts, but it nevertheless serves the interests of state governments and thus remains unquestioned.
It is indeed important to examine the unintended consequences of development initiatives as a total enterprise and especially to consider their place within a larger political economic context. To generalize Ferguson's astute observations in attempting to identify the "real" goal of development initiatives, however, is to ignore diversity both between and within bureaucracies, and it eschews the need to study them within particular historical and cultural contexts. In contrast to the case in Lesotho, for example, the conservation and development apparatus in Madagascar has scarcely been successful at bureaucratic expansion. This may be partly because of the local people's ability to resist such incursions on their lives and partly an effect of the kinds of projects that are funded: much money has been spent on personnel (mostly expatriate) and equipment (such as four-wheel drive vehicles) and less has gone to material reinforcements such as roads or toward development initiatives that affect a large segment of the population.
Additionally, bureaucracies are made up of factions that represent many different and even opposing interests. Disaggregating the conservation and development apparatus reveals multiple loyalties, competing objectives, and even internal jealousies. Local level offices may attune themselves more to the exigencies of working together with local people, whereas national offices of international aid organizations may orient themselves towards accountability to donor agencies. Individual departments within the national offices, however, may align themselves more closely with local needs because of their frequent contact with individual projects.
Even if it may be futile to attempt to reform the international aid infrastructure, given that these agencies operate within the hegemony of the international capitalist paradigm, suggestions for improvement may resonate with individuals who take the initiative to creatively manipulate and slowly change the form of the institutional structures within which they operate. Just as bureaucracies are not homogeneous, neither are they static. Their approaches have altered over time and they will change again. Although much about the institutional framework of conservation and development initiatives seems immutably, if unintentionally, contrary to the goals of broad social justice, I argue for the usefulness of pointed recommendations for changes that encourage people, and institutional arrangements, to consider local needs.
EXPATRIATE-HoST COUNTRY RELATIONS
An important source of dysfunction in the ability of conservation institutions to meet local needs stems from the 468 HUMAN ORGANIZATION relative power of international institutions and personnel compared with national ones. The relationship between donor and host must move away from an overly top-down approach by incorporating national locals, professionals, and institutions more consistently and effectively into conservation projects. Local participation must occur not only at the village level, but also in national and international offices.
To incorporate national professionals more thoroughly, representatives from international donor agencies and NGOs need to establish relations not only with chief executives of national institutions but also with mid-level bureaucrats, members of the private sector and local NGOs, representatives from universities and the general community. International consultants should be directed toward interviews with national professionals as well as with expatriates. Furthermore, each consultancy should ideally include the participation of a localconsulting firm not only to provide technical data, but to enhance the knowledge of the sociai and cultural context. Increasing the participation of local professionals is not only immediately useful in meeting conservation goals, but it has the added benefit of building local capacity and increasing the country's ability to operate self-sufficiently within the world system. . Specifically, the role of the expert, called the technical advisor in Madagascar, has been a source of tension both between donor organizations and the host government in general, but also within individual ICD projects. To address this tension and simultaneously increase the level of effective participation, expert assistance must not remain a synonym for expatriate competence. The trend of placing nationals into these roles, as has been the case in Madagascar, should continue.4 Furthermore, donors must avoid placing the burden of accountability for decisions on the experts unless they give them decision-making power. Finally, donor institutions' should provide technical assistance as a service provided only at the request of national institutions in order to respond to issues that nationals have themselves identified. Projects must incorporate enough flexibility for national directors to contribute to setting and revising the agenda as is deemed necessary.
In seeking to achieve greater levels of participation, the various parties must recognize and become familiar with each other's bureaucratic sociocultural contexts. Studies of the differences in business interactive styles, for example, have proven useful for creating an atmosphere conducive to cooperation and mutual understanding between Japanese and American business executives (Pfeiffer 1990 , Maloney 1990 . Any outside organization working in Madagascar must also take the time to become aware of the political, cultural, social, and cultural dynamics of the Malagasy administrative and executive context (Randriamitantsoa 1995; Andrianaivo 1995; P. Robinson, pers. comm.) . Likewise, Malagasy professionals may benefit from understanding Western interactive norms. Knowledge of these factors can make the difference between the success and failure of an undertaking.
THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY AND LEARNING FROM MISTAKES
There is no way to completely eliminate tension, to foresee all problems or to plan a perfect set of interventions. An important part of the response to such uncertainty is in recognizing that dilemmas and unintended circumstances will necessarily arise. Accepting conservation and development as a continual process of meeting and handling challenges encourages projects to develop innovative and site-specific interventions. Michael Dove writes of the importance of embracing the unknown, criticizing the tendency of development professionals to attempt to conquer it and develop deterministic solutions. He emphasizes that well-funded technical interventions alone cannot meet the challenge of development:
The lesson for development planners, therefore, is to write at the level not just of rules, but also of systems... [E]mbracing our ignorance, is, paradoxically, the best way to overcome it (1996:580-81) .
One of the most important factors in encouraging the success of ICDPs is in increasing the level of flexibility and autonomy that individual projects may have. Projects must be allowed to make mistakes and then to learn from them. The monitoring and evaluation process must actively encourage an atmosphere of critical self-examination where projects may analyze both what went wrong and what to do better next time. Project work plans must emphasize developing an effective operational process instead of focusing too closely on overly-specific interventions. Projects should be evaluated then on the way they confront unexpected circumstances and on their ability to empower local people to become involved in innovative project activities.
Donors and host governments can contribute to a positive intellectual,and practical atmosphere by making it clear in both actions and words that criticism does not necessarily equal a total condemnation of an intervention or of the project as a whole. Rather, criticism indicates room for growth and constructive change, which may bring the projects closer to fulfilling their stated goals. Donors can encourage honest reports and evaluations, recognizing that even the donors themselves are not immune to reproach. They can reward projects that respond to certain criticisms, instead of punishing those which generate critical commentary. .
Conclusion
No development project occurs in administrative isolation. The success of conservation efforts does not just depend on having a good project design, since the national and international resource management infrastructure plays an important role in enabling projects to meet their goals or in presenting barriers to effective implementation. Applied anthropologists, who tend to focus on the dynamics of specific interventions, should not ignore the role of external structures in setting the parameters for individual projects. In attempting to understand the effectiveness of an intervention, they need to examine the relationship of a local level project to external institutional constraints and possibilities. In addition to studying how to effect better participation of locals, for example, people must also examine how higher administrative levels encourage and discourage local involvement. Coming to an increasingly nuanced understanding of the way local contexts articulate with regional, national, and even international levels of political and economic analysis is a crucial part both of understanding the nature of dysfunction and of initiating conservation projects that meet local needs.
As anthropologists, we must study the sociocultural characteristics of the development apparatus itself, considering particularly the interactions between expatriates and host country nationals and institutions, as well as at relationships between people at different levels of administrative hierarchy within conservation institutions. We must encourage development agencies to analyze systems and processes of institutional interaction in addition to elaborating the particulars of specific technical solutions. By embracing uncertainty, conservation and development workers can prepare themselves to face unintended consequences and unknown futures. Although the international conservation infrastructure is unlikely to undergo radical alteration in the near future, individuals within it can be encouraged to consider the way their decisions affect both grassroots-Ievel participants and other institutional players.
Notes
IAlthough many conservation approaches, including the Strategic Objective Agreement, assume that poverty leads to degradation, some have pointed out that this relationship needs to be problematized. For a discussion of these issues, see Kates and Haarmann (1992) . 2 The major donors for the Environmental Plan Phase 1 (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) were:
-Government of Madagascar -The World Bank: IDA (contributing to FTM, DD, DEF, ANAE) -USAID (contributing to ANGAP, DEF, ONE) -United Nations Development Programme(UNDP)(ONE, DEF) -La Cooperation Suisse (ANAE) -La Cooperation Francaise (FTM) -FAO -KFW (German) (ICDPs) -UNESCO (ICDPs) -The Royal Norwegian Government (ONE, ANGAP) -European Union (considering funding 1CDPs) 3Also called the Plan d' Action Environnemental (PAE). 4Note that this strategy proves most successful when nationals working in regional offices are from that or a similar region. In the Mt. d' Ambre project, for example, several national directors have had a difficult time gaining the trust of the local people -both local staff and villagers, who have a longstanding resentment against the socioeconomically dominant groups from the region of the national capital.
